Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 33

Issue 3

Article 1

2001

Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards under the New South Africa
Labour Relations Act of 1995
Calvin William Sharpe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Calvin William Sharpe, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards under the New South Africa Labour Relations
Act of 1995, 33 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 277 (2001)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

ARTICLE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW SOUTH

AFRICA LABOUR RELATIONS ACT OF 1995

Calvin William Sharpe*
THE SETTING

Nelson Mandela's transition from political prisoner to head of state
and South Africa's transformation from repugnant apartheid regime to
multi-racial democratic society have been two of the twentieth century's
most profound political stories. Less prominent in this unfolding saga, yet
pivotal to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the
African National Congress (ANC),1 was Parliament's passage of the Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) on September 13, 1995, after more than
one year of drafting, negotiation among South Africa's social partners,2 and
mass political and economic action by unions.3 Although the South African
Labour Minister's Five Year Plan on reform legislation included the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, 4 the Employment Equity Act 55
* John Deaver Drinko - Baker & Hostefler Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law. The author is indebted to Arnold Zack, who laid the groundwork
and led the team of American arbitrators that consulted with the South African Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and in the process gained great appreciation for
the South African people and its government.
1 This program was developed by the ANC in 1994 to elaborate the policy details and
legislative initiatives that would build South Africa's economy and human resources. See D.
DU TOITTr AL., LABOUR RELATIONS LAW: A COMPREENSIVE GUIDE 17-18 (3d ed. 2000).
2 This term describes the three parties, government, organized labor, and organized
business participating with equal representation in the National Economic Development and
Labour Council (NEDLAC). NEDLAC was created in 1995 and consists of four chambers:
Trade and Industry, Public Finance and Monetary Policy, Labour Market, and Development.
It is a pre-parliamentary process that attempts to achieve consensus among the social
partners on all legislation relating to labor, economic, and development policy before it goes
to Parliament. Id. at 18-19.
3 Id. at 29-30.
4 Like the Fair Labor Standards Act in U.S. law, this statute sets forth minimum wage
and hour conditions for most South African workers. Compare Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1992), with §§ 6-18 of Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997,
4 JSRSA 1-240, 1-244 to -245 (1999).
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of 1998,5 and the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998,6 the LRA has been
described7 as the "first step" and "central statute" in this legislative
program
The LRA is a comprehensive statute that applies to all employees
except those employed by agencies related to national securit,8 It
addresses a broad range of issues including freedom of association, union
security, 10 a variety of collective bargaining rights,11 bargaining
councils,12
143
14
statutory councils, small and medium enterprises, industrial action,'
employee participation,1 6 unfair dismissal and dispute resolution. The LRA
codified protection of employees against unfair dismissal and reformed the
5
See §§ 5-6, 28-33 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, 4 JSRSA 1-263, 1-266,
1-269. Enforced through an Employment Equity Commission, this statute outlaws unfair
discrimination in employment.
6
This statute focuses on training, skills development, and employment services for

South Africans. See Skills Development Act 97 of 1998,4 JSRSA 2-306 (1998).
7 Du Torr ET AL., supra note 2, at 46, 55.
8 Specifically, the LRA excludes members of the National Defense Force, the National
Intelligence Agency, and the South African Secret Service. § 2 of the Labour Relations Act
66 of 1995, 4 JSRSA 2-165, 2-172 (1998).
9 Section 4 sets forth the trade union right of employees. Id. § 4 at 2-172.
1o Section 25 defines the rights and conditions of agency shop agreements. Section 26
defines the rights and conditions of closed shop agreements. Id. §§ 25-26 at 2-177.
11 Section 11 defines trade union representative, Section 12 sets forth the parameters of a
trade union's right of access to the workplace, Section 13 provides for dues check-off
authorization, and Sections 14 through 16 establish the rights of trade union representation.
Id. §§ 12-16 at 2-174 to -175. Sections 23 and 24 define the legal effect of collective
agreements and the handling of disputes involving such agreements. Id. §§ 23-24 at 2-176
to -177. Section 67 specifies the rights of employers and employees during strikes and
lockouts. Id. § 67 at 2-189.
12 Section 27 permits the establishment of bargaining councils and defines their powers
and function, id. §27 at 2-178, while Sections 51 and 52 deal with a bargaining council's
dispute resolution functions and accreditation, id. §§ 51-52 at 2-185.
13 Section 39(1) and (2) provide for the establishment of statutory councils. Id. § 39 at 2182. Section 43 sets forth the powers and functions of statutory councils. Id. § 43 at 2-183.
Section 44 permits ministerial determinations upon recommendations by statutory councils.
Id. § 44 at 2-183.
14 Section 30(l)(b) requires that "the constitution of every bargaining council at least
provide for ...the representation of small and medium enterprises." Id. § 30 at 2-179.
15 Sections 65 through 69 govern the use of economic weapons. Id. §§ 65-69 at 2-188 to
-189. Section 70 provides for the determination of an essential service. Employees
designated as working in an essential service are prohibited from striking under Section
65(d)(i). Id. § 70 at 2-189.
16 Section 78 and Sections 80 through 94 provide for workplace forums. Id. §§ 78, 8094 at 1-192 to -196.
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dispute resolution system building upon the Interim Constitution's Bill of
Rights, which includes the right to fair labor practices, 17 the jurisprudence
in the old Industrial Court and Labour Court regarding unfair dismissal,
and the ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms under the old
Labour Relations Act."
The LRA gives every employee protection against unfair
dismissal. 19 Unlike dismissals that implicate important statutory rights and
17

Section 27 of the Interim Constitution reads:
(1) Every person shall have the right to fair labor practices.
(2) Workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions, and employers shall
have the right to form and join employers' organizations.
(3) Workers and employers shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
(4) Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining.

(5) Employers' recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining
shall not be impaired, subject to Section 33 (1).
18 Statistics showed very low settlement rates by the old conciliation boards (20%) and
industrial councils (less than 30%) and delays in the ultimate resolution of disputes going to
the Industrial and Labour Courts. See du Toit et al., supra note 2, at 24-25..
19 Section 185 provides:
Every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.
§ 185 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 4 JSRSA 2-165, 2-215 (1998).
Section 186 provides:
"Dismissal" means that (a) an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without
notice;
(b) an employee reasonably expected the employer to renew a fixed term
contract of employment on the same or similar terms but the employer
offered to renew it on less favourable terms, or did not renew it;
(c) an employer refused to allow an employee to resume work after she (i) took maternity leave in terms of any law, collective agreement or
her contract of employment; or

(ii) ...
[Sub-para. (ii) deleted by s.95 (4) of Act 75 of 1997.]
(d) an employer who dismissed a number of employees for the same or
similar reasons has offered to re-employ one or more of them but has refused
to re-employ another; or
(e) an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice
because the employer made continued employment intolerable for the
employee.
Id. § 186 at 2-215.
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are deemed automatically unfair 2° or those that involve operational
requirements,2 1 disputes about the substantive and procedural fairness of

20 Section 187 defines automatically unfair dismissals as follows:

(1) A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the
employee, acts contrary to section 5 (footnote admitted) or, if the reason for the
dismissalis (a) that the employee participated in or supported, or indicated an intention
to participate in or support, a strike or protest action that complies with the
provisions of Chapter IV; (footnote omitted)
(b) that the employee refused, or indicated an intention to refuse, to do any
work normally done by an employee who at the time was taking part in a
strike that complies with the provisions of Chapter IV or was locked out,
unless that work is necessary to prevent an actual danger to life, personal
safety or health;
(c) to compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of
mutual interest between the employer and employee;
(d) that the employee took action, or indicated an intention to take action,
against the employer by (i) exercising any right conferred by this Act; or
(ii) participating in any proceedings in terms of this Act;
(e) the employee's pregnancy, intended pregnancy, or any reason related to
her pregnancy;
(f) that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or
indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender,
sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, marital status or
family responsibility.
(2) Despite subsection (1)(f)

-

(a) a dismissal may be fair if the reason for dismissalis based on an inherent
requirement of the particular job;
(b) a dismissal based on age is fair, if the employee has reached the normal
or agreed retirement age for persons in that capacity.
Id. §187 at 2-215.
21 Section 188 provides:

(1) A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to
prove(a) that the reason for dismissalis a fair reason(i) related to the employee's conduct or capacity; or
(ii) based on the employer's operationalrequirements;and
(b) that the dismissalwas effected in accordance with a fair procedure.
(2) Any person considering whether or not the reason for dismissal is a fair
reason or whether or not the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair
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dismissals are referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration (CCMA).22 In that forum an unsuccessful attempt at statutorily
mandated conciliation is followed by arbitration, where the employer who
cannot prove the substantive and procedural fairness of a dismissal is
subjected to an injunctive or monetary remedial order.2 Although Section
191(9) of the Act makes it clear that a Commissioner's arbitration award is
final, any party alleging a defect in any CCMA arbitration proceeding may
apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside the award.2 Also, any
party may appl for leave to appeal a Labour Court judgment to the Labour
Appeal Court. The LRA does not permit any appeal from a judgment of
the Labor Appeal Court. 26
procedure must take into account any relevant code of good practice issued in
terms of this Act.
Id. § 188 at 2-215.
22 Section 191 provides for the referral of conduct and capacity dismissal disputes to the
CCMA. Id. § 191 at 2-216. Other disputes are referred to the Labour Court under Sections
187 and 188. Id §§ 187-188 at 2-215.
23 id.
24 Section 145 provides:

(1) Any party to a dispute who alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings
under the auspices of the Commission may apply to the Labour Court for an order
setting aside the arbitration award(a) within six weeks of the date that the award was served on the applicant,
unless the alleged defect involves corruption: or
(b) if the alleged defect involves corruption, within six weeks of the date that
the applicant discovers the corruption.
(2) A defect referred to in subsection (1), means(a) that the commissioner(i) committed misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner
as an arbitrator;
(ii) committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings; or
(iii) exceeded the commissioner's powers; or
(b) that an award has been improperly obtained.
(3) The Labour Court may stay the enforcement of the award pending its
decision.
(4) If the award is set aside, the Labour Court may (a) determine the dispute in the manner it considers appropriate; or
(b) make any order it considers appropriate about the procedures to be
followed to determine the dispute.
Id. § 145 at 2-207.
25 Section 166 provides:
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The CCMA employs 111 full-time commissioners and 256 parttime commissioners throughout South Africa's nine provincesY Given the

broad protections against unfair dismissal and the guaranteed forum for
adjudicating dismissal disputes, it is not surprising that the CCMA has been
inundated since its effective date of operation in November 1996. From
November 1996 to the end of December 1998, the CCMA closed 115,744
cases. 2 In 1998 it received an average of 323 cases every working day. 29
A total of 81,397 disputes were referred to the CCMA in 1998, a 35%
increase over 1997.30 Of the 63,208 cases handled that year, 38,000 were

conciliated and just over 14,000 arbitrated.31 In some ways it is remarkable

that a staff of 367 full and part-time Commissioners serving all nine
provinces in 1998 could produce these numbers.

(1) Any party to any proceedings before the Labour Court may apply to the Labour
Court for leave to appeal to the Labour Appeal Court against any final judgment or
final order of the Labour Court.
(2) If the application for leave to appeal is refused, the applicant may petition the
Labour Appeal Court for leave to appeal.
(3) Leave to appeal may be granted subject to any conditions that the Court
concerned may determine.
(4) Subject to the Constitution and despite any other law, an appeal against any
final judgment or final order of the Labour Court in any matter in respect of which
the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction may be brought only to the Labour
Appeal Court.
Id. § 166 at 2-212.
26 Section 167 provides:
(1) The Labour Appeal Court is hereby established as a court of law and equity.
(2) The Labour Appeal Court is the final court of appeal in respect of all
judgments and orders made by the Labour Court in respect of the matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction.
(3) The Labour Appeal Court is a superior court that has authority, inherent
powers and standing, in relation to matters under its jurisdiction, equal to that
which the Supreme Court of Appeal has in relation to matters under its
jurisdiction.
[Sub-s. (3) amended by s. 18 of Act 127 of 1998.]
(4) The Labour Appeal Court is a court of record.
Id. § 167 at 2-212.
27 John Brand, CCMA: Achievements and Challenges- Lessons From the First Three
Years, 21 I.L.J. 77, 82 (S. Aft.) (2000) (citing 1998 CCMA Review).
28

id.

29

id.

30 Id.
31

id.
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THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL REvIEW UNDER THE LRA

The sheer weight of the CCMA caseload places a premium upon
the final, informal, efficient and cost-effective resolution of dismissal
disputes. The drafters of the Labour Relations Bill envisioned the processes
32
of conciliation and arbitration to be well suited to satisfying these criteria.
However, the goal of finality is threatened to the extent that courts are
permitted to second-guess arbitration awards. Indeed, the American labor
arbitration structure and experience suggest that a broad scope of judicial
review of arbitration awards undermines the attributes of arbitration.
The LRA recognizes the need to prevent judicial intrusion upon the
process by providing for judicial review rather than appeal of
arbitration
arbitation34
arbitration awards. The Court has jurisdiction under the latter to reverse
an award based on its incorrectness; under the former a reversal on the
merits would exceed the Court's authority.3 5 Moreover, Section 145
narrowly constrains the grounds for setting aside an award on review to the
following:
(a) ... the commissioner --(i)

committed misconduct in relation to
commissioner as an arbitrator;

the duties

of the

(ii) committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration

proceedings; or
(iii) exceeded the commissioner's powers; or
36
(b) ... an award has been improperly obtained.

32 See Shoprite Checkers (PTY) Ltd. v. A Ramdaw, (2000) 21 I.L.J. 1232 (LC).
Referring to ExplanatoryMemorandum, 16 I.L.J. 278, Judge Wallis said the following:
When the Bill was initially published for comment it was accompanied by a
In that memorandum it was explained
lengthy explanatory memorandum ....
that the existing system of dispute resolution, particularly as it related to cases of
unfair dismissal, was complex inefficient, protracted and expensive. The high
level of legalism which characterised the system was noted with approbation. The
dispute resolution provisions contained in the Bill are directed at resolving these
problems.
id. at 159.
33 See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); See
generally Calvin William Sharpe, Judicial Review Of Labor Arbitration Awards: A View
From The Bench, 52 NAT'L AcAD. ARns. ANN. PRoc. 126 (1999).
34 See § 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 4 JSRSA 2-165, 2-207 to -208
(1998); See Carephone (Pty) Ltd. v. Marcus N.O. and others, (1998) 19 I.L.J. 1425, 1427
(LAC), 1 1.
3- See Carephone,19 I.L.J. at 1435, 36.
36 § 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 4 JSRSA 2-165, 2-207 to -208 (1998).
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True to the distinction between review and appeal, these grounds seem to
be preoccupied with procedural problems that prevent the arbitration
process from functioning as intended (review). They do not appear to
permit an37assessment of the merits of an award and reversal based on error
(appeal).
Even if the LRA only contained Section 145, the American
experience under the Federal Arbitration Act suggests that the Labour Court
38
might not have been able to resist the pressure to review the merits.
Terms like "gross irregularity" that call for the exercise of judgment present
an opportunity for broadening judicial consideration of the merits.
However, Section 145 does not stand alone in the LRA as a governor of the
Labour Court's power of judicial review. It coexists with Section 158(1)(g)
which says:
(1) The Labour Court may ----

(g) despite section 145, review the performance or purported
performance of any function provided for in this Act or any act

37 It should be noted that this standard is very similar to the Federal Arbitration Act of
1947, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000), at 1221, which provides:

(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is'vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
38 All Federal Appellate Circuits have articulated non-statutory standards that permit
courts to review the merits of commercial arbitration awards under Section 10(a) of the
Federal Arbitration Act. See generally Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm For
Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking The Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the
JudicialStandardsfor Vacatur, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 443, 466-496 (1998).
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or omission of any person or body in terms of this Act on any
39
grounds that are permissible in law.

The guarantee of just administrative action in the Bill of Rights of the South
African Constitution may be interpreted as furnishing grounds for

reviewing the performances of CCMA arbitrators as reflected in arbitration
awards.40
Before the Labor Appeal Court's 1998 decision in Carephone(Pty)
Ltd. v. Marcus N.O. and others,41 the relationship between Section 145(2)
and 158(1)(g) presented a dilemma for Labor Court judges. Section
145(2)(a) and (b) virtually track the narrow grounds for setting aside the
award contained in the earlier Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.
That statute focused on misconduct, gross irregularities, excessive powers,
and impropriety in securing the award and did not permit a court to secondguess the merits of an award. 42 As already noted, Section 158(1)(g) permits
review of any function under the LRA on any grounds that are permissible
in law "despite section 145." By its terms this section furnishes a more

generous basis of review that might
43 include an assessment of the
Commissioner's decision on the merits.
39 § 158 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 4 JSRSA 2-211 (1998).
40 See infranote5l.
41
42

See Carephone,19 I.L.J. 1425.
Section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 provided:

(1) Where:
(a) any member of an arbitration tribunal has misconducted himself in
relation to his duties as arbitrator or umpire; or
(b) an arbitration tribunal has committed any gross irregularity in the
conduct of the arbitration proceedings or has exceeded its powers; or
(c) an award has been improperly obtained, the court may, on the application
of any party to the reference after due notice to the other party or parties,
make an order setting the award aside.
(2) An application pursuant to this section shall be made within six weeks after
the publication of the award to the parties: Provided that when the setting aside of
the award is requested on the grounds of corruption, such application shall be
made within six weeks after the discovery of the corruption and in any case not
later than three years after the date on which the award was so published.
§ 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, 1 JSRSA (1998).
See Dickenson & Brown v. Fisher's Executors, 1915 AD 166, at 174-175; Amalgamated
Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Veldspun Limited, (1994) 1 SA 162 (AD at 1681169C) (standing for the proposition that error in fact or law does not constitute arbitral
misconduct).
43 Although the Federal Arbitration Act does not contain contradictory provisions that
create uncertainty about the scope of review of arbitral awards, American courts have
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Understandably, these seemingly contradictory directives left
Labour Court judges ambivalent about the reviewing function. Should
Labour Court judges limit their review of Commissioner awards to the
narrow grounds set forth in Section 145(2)(a) and (b)? Should they
scrutinize the merits of the award for correctness as, arguably, required by
Section 158(1)(g)? Or should any reviewing standard reflect some effort at
reconciling the two provisions?
This ambivalence about the relationship between Sections
145(2)(a) and (b) and 158(1)(g) in defining the scope of review was
reflected in Kynoch Feeds (Pty) Ltd and Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation And Arbitration and others," where Judge Revelas traced his
own history of first adopting then rejecting the view that Section 158(l)(g)
applied only to administrative acts other than arbitrators' awards. 45 Under
the earlier view, Section 145 applied to CCMA arbitration for sound policy
reasons, "particularly in the field of labour where it is advantageous to all
parties and in the interests of good labour relations to have a binding
decision made finally and expeditiously." 46 Judge Revelas later changed
his view, holding that arbitration is an administrative action to which
Section 158(1)(g) applies and that Section 145 has no application. 47
Acknowledging the increased interference with Commissioner awards that
this broader review entailed, the judge felt that all interested parties would
be better served by "a strong body of guidelines and principles to be
followed by [CCMA commissioners]."
In Carephone the Labor Appeal Court finally addressed the
appropriate standard of review of Commissioner awards issued under the
auspices of the CCMA. The Court in Carephone found a general
consistency between the LRA and the CCMA, on the one hand, and the
requirements of the constitution, on the other.49 While affirming the Labor
created the same uncertainty by enunciating non-statutory standards that permit a review of
the merits of commercial awards. American scholars have disagreed about how extensive
such review should be. Compare Hayford, supra note 39 (advocating limited review), with
Martin H. Malin and Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice:A JurisprudentialPerspective
On Labor And Employment Arbitration from The Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HAsTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993), and Norman S. Poser, JudicialReview Of ArbitrationAwards:

Manifest DisregardOf The Law, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 471 (1998) (advocating broader review
in some cases).
44 (1998) 19 I.L.J. 836 (LC).
45 Id. at846, 139.
46 Id. at 847, 40.
47 Id. at847, 143.
41 Id. at 848, 48.
49 See Carephone, 19 I.L.J. 1425. It also pointed to the consistency between the purpose
of the LRA in general-to give effect to and regulate the fundamental right conferred by
section 27 of the Constitution [the workers rights section], id. at 1432, H 21-22, and to
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Court's judicial authority to review Commissioner arbitration awards, the
CarephoneCourt was also careful to distinguish its review function from an
appeal. Judge Froneman read sections 145 and 158(1)(g) together. Section
145 imposes procedural requirements on Commissioners. Section 158(g)
broadens the scope of judicial review under the administrative justice
section of the Bill of Rights to permit a review of the merits.50
interpret the provisions of the LRA, id. at 1429, 8, and the specific obligation of a
commissioner to determine the dispute fairly and quickly and with a minimum of formalities
in Section 138 of the LRA, on the one hand, id. at 1432, 1 21, and the constitutional right to
just administrative actions found in the Bill of Rights [sec. 33 and Item 23(2) of Sch. 6 of the
Const.] on the other, id, at 1434, 31. Judge Revalas' later view may betray a judicial mood
in some quarters regarding the competency of CCMA awards. For example, Susan R.
Brown, American labor arbitrator and consultant to the CCMA, sees the Court's Carephone
decision as result-oriented. She noted that the CCMA was the first government agency that
was created after the dismantling of apartheid. Ms. Brown observed that the Commissioners
initially employed by the CCMA were selected to represent a diversity of the South African
population, a deliberate choice of representation across the political and cultural spectrum
designed to make the CCMA's work (including arbitration awards) more credible to the
public. As a result, many Commissioners did not have legal backgrounds or speak English
as a first language, and they came from working rather than intellectual traditions. In Ms.
Brown's view, it appeared that the Labor Courts interpreted the law of judicial review to give
themselves more supervisory authority over awards because of a concern about the legal
sufficiency as well as the public credibility of CCMA awards. Telephone Interview with
Susan Brown, American Arbitrator and Consultant to the South African Government
(CCMA) (Febuary 13,2002).
*0 Section 33 of the South Africa Constitution reads as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action
has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must (a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1)

and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration.
CONST. OF S. AFR. § 33 (1997), reprinted in CONSnTtrONS OF Tm COUTrRIus OF Tm
WORLD (Release 97-7) (Gilbert H. Flanz ed., Inter-University Associates, inc. trans., Oceana
Publications, Inc. 1997).
Judge Froneman makes the point in Carephonethat Section 33(1) and (2) should be read as
incorporating Item 23(2) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution until the legislation envisaged in
Sections 33(3) is enacted. Item 23(2) reads:
Every person has the right to(a) lawful administrative action where any of their rights or interests is
affected or threatened;
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However, unlike an appeal, where the question is whether the
award is correct, section 158(1)(g) only permits an inquiry into whether the
award as an administrative action under the constitution is justifiable in
relation to the reasons given for it, the constitutional standard set forth at
Item 23(2)(d) of Schedule 6.51 The Court also referred to this
"justifiability" standard as a requirement of substantive rationality. The
question for the reviewing courts is:
[I]s there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the
administrative decision-maker between the material pro2perly available to
him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?
The Carephone court saw the justifiability standard as preserving
the distinction between permissible review and impermissible appeal. The
Court also acknowledged that "only judicial precedent will be able to give
more specific content to the broad concept of justifiability. 53
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT

While the Carephone mandate might have appeared to require a
daunting high wire act of walking the fine line between review and appeal
in evaluating arbitration awards, the Labour Court has actually performed
the task quite well. A review of the cases suggests that the Labor Court has
largely captured the sense of "justifiability" in reviewing arbitration awards
articulated by the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone. A particularly apt
formulation of the distinction between appeal and review is found in
Johannes Lowewik Cotzee v. Justice Lebea, N.O. Santam LD, where
Acting Judge Cheadle said the following:
The fact that a reviewing court may have come to a different result if the
matter had been brought on appeal can never be, on its own, a basis for
attacking the process of reasoning. If it did, then the distinction between
appeal and review would be obliterated. And whatever effect the
constitutional entrenchment of the right to administrative justice may
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or
legitimate expectations is affected or threatened;
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which
affects any of their rights or interests unless the reasons for that action have
been made public; and
(d) adminstrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given
for it where any of their rights is affected or threatened.
See Carephone, 19 I.L.J. at 1431,

16.

51 See id. (explaining that administrative action must be justifiable in relation to the
reasons for it).
52

Carephone, 19 I.L.J. at 1435,

53

id.

37.
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have on our common law, it does not mandate a destruction of the
distinction between these two remedies. What then distinguishes the two
remedies when it comes to applying them to the reasoning process
employed by a tribunal? It seems to me that the seeds of the distinction
lie in the phrase so commonly used to describe a process failure in the
reasoning phase of a tribunal's proceedings - 'the failure to apply one's
mind. That test is different from the one that applies to an appeal namely, whether another court could come to a different conclusion.
Accordingly, once a reviewing court is satisfied that the tribunal has
applied its mind, it will not interfere with the result even if it would have
come to a different conclusion. The best demonstration of applying one's
mind is whether the outcome can be sustained by the facts found and the
not on
law applied. The
54 emphasis is on the range of reasonable outcomes
the correct one.

Although predictably, a substantial majority of awards are upheld
as justifiable under Carephone, the cases tend to fall into three categories:
(1) the easy cases where the decision is correct and the Labor Court
dismisses the application, or the award is not justifiable, (2) the harder
cases where the award is wrong but justifiable, and (3) the misapplication
cases where the award, wrong or right, is set aside because of the Court's
misapplication of the standard.
Examples abound of easy cases where the award is correct and
upheld as justifiable.5 5 Following are two examples of easy cases where the
award was deemed to lack justifiability. In Dairybell Pty v. CCMA,56 the
company dismissed an employee for four counts of misconduct: (1)
misappropriation of company funds, (2) unauthorized possession of
company property, (3) breach of confidentiality in the handling of company
information, and (4) breach of confidentiality for personal gain. While
suggesting in his award that the employee had engaged in the misconduct,
the Commissioner inexplicably ordered the company to compensate the
employee an amount equivalent to six months salary. The Labor Court set
54 See Johannes Lowewik Coetzee and Justice Lebea, N.O. Santam Ltd., (1999) Case

No. J250/98 (LAC), 10, availableat http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
5 See Waverley Blankets Ltd. v. CCMA & others (2000); Aitken v. Khoza & others,
(2000) 5 LLD 504 (LC); Gqibela v. West Driefontein Mine & others, (2000) 4 BLLR 414
(LC); Dr. Gabeba Abrahams v. South African Cultural History Museum, (1999) Case No.
C89/98 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; Themba Mtshali v. CCMA, (1999)
Case No. J3103/98 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; East Rand Gold and
Uranium Co. Ltd v. CCMA & others, (1999) Case No. J1351/97 (LC), available at
http'/www.legalinfo.co.za; Purefresh Foods (Pty) Ltd. v. Advocate L. Dayal & others,
(1999) Case No. D239/98 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; OD Zaayman v.
CCMA and others, (1999) 20 I.L.J. 412 (LC).
56 See Dairybelle (Pty) Ltd. v. CCMA, (1999) 10 BLLR 1033 (LC), available at
http'//www.legalinfo.co.za.
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aside the award because the Court could not comprehend what the
Commissioner had found, since he had furnished no reasons. The Court
noted that such reasons could be brief, but that they needed to demonstrate
"a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the . . .
decision-maker between the material properly available to him and the
conclusion he or she eventually arrived at." 57 The Court went on to make
the following statement:
A consideration of the Commissioner's reasons [makes] it impossible to
ascertain precisely what misconduct was found to have been proved and
why the employee was acquitted of other charges. The Commissioner's
discussion of the appropriate sanction suggests that he found some
misconduct to have been proved but the precise nature of that misconduct
is nowhere stated. Where, as in the present case, there are several charges
of misconduct, each ought to be separately dealt with and the arbitrator's
analysis and conclusions in relation to each count ought to be clearly set
out. It is only in this way that the arbitrator's reasoning and conclusions
will be comprehensible. In my58view, the standard of justifiability has not
been met in the present matter.
This conclusion seems clearly correct, since the Commissioner's conclusion
seems wrong and the Commissioner makes no effort to support it with
reasons.5 9 The Court's refusal to accept the Commissioner's unexplained
conclusions that appear wrong should not be controversial. In this situation
the Court has no way of evaluating whether a rational objective basis
exists.60
57

id.

"s Id. at 17.
59

The Court relied upon the following instructive quote from an administrative law text

in demonstrating the importance of supplying reasons:
There is a strong case to be made for the giving of reasons as an essential element
of administrative justice. The need for it has been sharply exposed by the
expanding law of judicial review now that so many decisions are [likely] to be
quashed or appealed... on ground of improper purpose, irrelevant consideration
(sic) and errors of law of various kinds. Unless the citizen can discover the
reasoning behind the decision, he may be unable to tell whether it is reviewable or
not and so he may be deprived of the protection of the law. A right to reasons is
therefore an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review. Natural
justice may provide the best rubric for it since the giving of reasons is required by
the ordinary [person's] sense of justice. It is also a healthy discipline for all who
exercise power over others.
Id. at 16.
60 See Reutech Defense Industries (Pty) Ltd. t/a Reutech Defence Industries v. Govender
& others, (2000) 9 BLLR 1101 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za (where the

2001]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS

In Malelane Toyota and the CCMA,61 the Court set aside an award
in favor of an employee dismissed for fraud, where the Commissioner,
believing that a CCMA proceeding was not a trial de novo, considered only
the evidence at the company's disciplinary hearing and not the more
complete evidence establishing the fraud at the arbitration. Since the
reasons for the award related only to the company's internal discipline
that the award was not justifiable in relation to the
process, the Court found
62
reasons given for it.
Although the Commissioner's refusal to consider relevant evidence
probably qualifies as misconduct under Section 145(2)(a)(i) of the LRA, it
also necessarily negates a rational objective basis justifying the connection
between the Commissioner's conclusion and the "material properly
available to him," where the Commissioner explicitly ignores some of that
material.
The second category of cases, the harder cases, suggests that
Labor Court judges appreciate the distinction between review under the
"justifiability" standard and appeal. In these cases the Court refuses to set
aside an award, even though it would have reached a different outcome
from the Commissioner. For example, in MetroCash & Carry Ltd. v.
FrancoisLe Roux, 63 the company dismissed an employee for assaulting a
customer in a manner that admittedly exceeded the bounds of self-defense.
Despite the employee's opportunities to defuse the situation, the
Commissioner found that dismissal was an excessive sanction in light of the
customer's provocation and ordered the employee reinstated after what
amounted to a six-week suspension. Quoting extensively from the
operative language of Carephone, the Court reminded the reader of its
jurisdiction as a reviewing court rather than an appellate court. Finding the
Commissioner's reasoning rational, the Court dismissed the application
with the following observations:
The conclusions reached by the [Commissioner] . . . in making his
arbitration award [are] such that I do not necessarily agree on the
correctness of the outcome thereof. However, in reviewing arbitration
awards of the CCMA the Labour Court must leave some room for
differing opinions, as long as those opinions are justifiable in relation to
the reasons given for [them]. This is not an easy test but I believe that the
Labour Court should heed the warning by the Labour Appeal Court and
Commissioner ignored a positive lab test and inexplicably did not award full back pay
despite a finding that the company failed to prove intoxication leading to the setting aside of
the award under the Carephonestandard).
61 See Malelane Toyota v. the CCMA, (1999) 6 BLLR 555 (LC), available at
http'J/www.legalinfo.co.za.
62

id.

63 See MetroCash & Carry Ltd. v. Francois Le Roux, (1999) 4 BLLR 351 (LC),
availableat http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
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not enter the merits of such arbitration award
64 with a view to substitute the
Court's opinion on the correctness thereof.
Another example of the harder cases is City Lodge Hotels Ltd. and
Annelie Gildenhuys N.O. and Others,65 where a Commissioner ordered the
reinstatement of employees who had been dismissed for the improper
removal of company property. The record, consisting exclusively of the
Commissioner's notes, contained conflicting evidence on whether the
employees were guilty, and the company cited evidence suggesting guilt in
its application for review. The Court dismissed the application noting that
the balancing and weighing of evidence is primarily a matter for the
Commissioner and not the Court unless a decision gives "manifestly
excessive or manifestly inadequate weight ... to a relevant consideration."
The Court concluded that "notwithstanding factors pointing to a suspicion
of misconduct on the part of employees," it was simply not the place of the
Court to interfere with the arbitration award on review. 6
In this category of cases Labor Court judges have been faithful to
the distinction in Carephone between "justifiability" and "correctness" and
the admonition that the judge should "enter the merits [of the
Commissioner's award] not in order to substitute his or her own opinion on
the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally
justifiable." It is also noteworthy that the Court in these cases cites the
language of Carephone distinguishing between "justifiability" and
"correctness."
The misapplication cases are those in which judges do not seem to
properly distinguish between review and appeal or to otherwise fully
appreciate the spirit of the Carephone decision.
67
In Metcash Trading (Pty) Ltd. and Mr. Sithole N.O. and Others,
the employer subjected six employees to six disciplinary hearings based on
capturing them on videotape taking stock and hiding it on their persons.
Six different presiding officers of the company conducted hearings finding
three employees guilty and one not guilty; two charges were withdrawn.
The employer dismissed the three employees found guilty and they referred
the dispute to the CCMA. The Commissioner found disparate treatment in
violation of the code of good practice, since all six employees had been

64 Id. at U 13-15.
6

See City Lodge Hotels Ltd. v. Annelie Gildenhuys N.O. and others, (1999) Case No.

J3054/98 (LC), availableat http:/www.legalinfo.co.za.
Id. U 33, 35.
See Metcash Trading (Pty) Ltd. v. Mr. Sithole N.O. and Others, (1998) Case No.
J1079/97 (LC), availableat http://www.legalinfo.co.za
6

67
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suspected of misconduct and only the three applicants had been dismissed,
and ordered the three employees reinstated with back pay.
The Court reviewed and set aside the award because the
Commissioner incorrectly thought the standard of misconduct encompassed
actual or suspected misconduct, and therefore, misapplied the disparate
treatment analysis. Since the employer found only the three dismissed
employees actually guilty of misconduct, it was appropriate that only they
be dismissed even though all six employees had been suspected of
misconduct. Saying that the Commissioner must understand the law in
order to apply it reasonably and arrive at a justifiable conclusion, the court
said the following in its Carephoneanalysis:
In any event, I must point out that if this case is to be decided on the basis
reasons for the
that the award must be justifiable in relation to the
award, then it is clear that the reasoning must take place in accordance
with the logic permitted by the law. Put differently, but basically stating
the same, the material which the commissioner takes into account must
not simply be the factual material but must also include the rule of law
which is applicable. This must be applied in order to arrive at a
conclusion which is justifiable in light of that material. Where there is an
error of reasoning and a misunderstanding of the law, then it is highly
likely, and in this case it has been shown to be the case, that the award
will not be a justifiable one.6
While the judge's decision is very persuasive on the merits, it is
difficult to see what is left of the distinction between review and appeal if
the Commissioner cannot be wrong in his plausible interpretation and
application of the disparate treatment rule without having the award set
aside. Where judges under the guise of justifiability are effectively
reviewing the merits for correctness, the Commissioner's only chance of
preserving an award on69 review is by reaching the right decision - not
simply a justifiable one.
And in another case in the misapplication category, Mogamat
Rashad Solomon and CCMA, and others,' " a case that seems to be a
caricature of Carephone, an employee referred to the CCMA a dispute
about his failure to receive a promotion claiming that the successful
candidate was not qualified for the position under the National Building
Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1997 and that he was better
qualified and should have received the position. At the hearing the
Commissioner properly narrowed the issues, with the parties' consent, to
s Id. at 15.
Compare id., with Sappi Fine Papers v. Lallie, (1998) Case No. P235/98 (LC),
availableat http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
70 Mogamat Rashad Solomon v. CCMA and others, (1999) 20 I.L.J. 2960 (LC).
69
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the question of whether the successful candidate was qualified for his
appointment in keeping with the 103 Act. The Commissioner found that
the 103 Act did not apply and dismissed the application, but not before also
finding that the appointment of the successful candidate was unfair and also
that the Commissioner could not award the applicant the appointment
because "the applicant was not in a position to produce the evidence needed
to justify such relief."71
Even though the outcome of the case was correct, the Court set
aside the award based on the reasoning. Since only the question of 103 Act
coverage was before the Commissioner after the issues were narrowed, the
Commissioner did not properly stick to the issues in allowing the evidence
admitted or making the further findings on other issues. On this point the
Court said:
If I were simply required to consider whether the outcome was
rational on the basis of the evidence properly before [the Commissioner]
and on the issue as identified at the outset, in a vacuum so to speak, I
would not have been inclined to set aside the award. However, although
the second respondent reached what appears to have been the correct
decision on the issues as narrowed he did so on the basis of faulty
reasoning and after introducing and pronouncing upon issues which he
ought not to have been considering.

I considered the advisability of taking a very narrow view of the
Carephone ratio, which it seems would enable me to simply say that the
"conclusion eventually arrived at" by second respondent, namely, to
dismiss the application, was justifiable in relation to the "material
properly available" to him, being that evidence in relation only to the
issues as narrowed. Such an approach might have produced7 a2 "correct"
result but that is not, in my view, what I am called upon to do.
The Court proceeded to discuss its concerns about due process and
sending the wrong message to Commissioners. But this case suggests that
some Labor Court judges may view reasoning as even more important than
results after Carephone. Query whether7 the
Carephone standard supports
3
this "putting of the cart before the horse."
Finally, in a decision couched in the language of review but
subjecting the Commissioner's award to the scrutiny of an appeal, the Court
71

72

Id. at2967, [20.
Id. at 2966-67, 20-21.

73 But see Gqibela v. West Driefontein Mine & others, (2000) 4 BLLR 414 (LC), at 1 5
(suggesting that good results without good reasons constitute a basis for setting aside
judgments on review but not on appeal, where good results are enough).
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in Eddels SA (Pty) Ltd v. Sewcharan & others74 set aside an award as too
legalistic. The Commissioner had upheld the dismissal of two employees
but awarded compensation based on his finding of procedural unfairness.
The Commissioner had held that an employer must "properly and
thoroughly" explain the function of mitigation after announcing a verdict.
The Commissioner based this view on the need to focus the employee on
the mitigation factors that the employer must consider in dismissal cases
under the Code of Good Practice. 75 He concluded that it was not sufficient
for the employer to deal with the issue in the initial stages of the
disciplinary procedure. The Labour Court considered "whether the fact that
mitigating evidence was not presented after the verdict stage is a
sufficiently material procedural flaw warranting an award of
compensation. 7 6 The company argued that the Commissioner's finding
regarding the necessity of a two-stage procedure on mitigation was
incorrect. While acknowledging the good reasons for the Commissioner's
ruling the Court dismissed them as idealistic concluding as follows:
[T]he fact that a two stage inquiry was not held is not a flaw which would
amount to procedural unfairness within the meaning of our law. To
require a two state inquiry, ie, a separate inquiry only after the finding of
guilt, is to expect too much of lay employers. To punish them for failing
to do so with a hefty compensation award, is to institute an overly
technical and legalistic dimension into the employer/employee
relationship which the new Labour Relations Act certainly did not
intend.77
The Labour Court's conclusion that in reaching his ruling the
Commissioner had "not... adequately applied his mind" is belied by the
Court's earlier approval of the Commissioner's reasoning. It is also a thinly
veiled attempt to mask the Court's disagreement with the merits of the
Commissioner's award.

74

Eddels South Africa (Pty) Ltd v. Sewcharan & others, (2000) 21 I.LJ. 1344, 1347

(LC).
75 Schedule 8, item 3(5) of the Labour Relations Act provides:

(5) When deciding whether or not to impose the penalty of dismissal, the employer
should in addition to the gravity of the misconduct consider factors such as the
employee's circumstances (including length of service, previous disciplinary
record and personal circumstances), the nature of the job and the circumstances of
the infringement itself.
§ 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 4 JSRSA 2-165, 2-251 (1998).
76 See Eddels, (2000) 21 I.L.J. 1344, at 1347, 3.
7
Id. at par. 14.
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CHALLENGES To CAREPHONE

Perhaps because of these categories of harder cases and
misapplication cases, Carephone's basic premises have been challenged in
Labor Appeal Court and Labor Court decisions. In Toyota South Africa
Motors (Pty) Lt. and Douglas Radebe and others,8 a Labour Appeal Court
decision, Judge Nicholson characterizes the "justifiability" standard as
obiter dictum and expresses doubt about whether "justifiability" can be an
independent ground of review. He makes two points. First, noting that the
LRA does not permit an appeal from an arbitration award, Judge Nicholson
regards "justifiability" review as impermissible, since it "amounts, to all
intents and purposes, to an appeal." Judge Nicholson also points out that
Section 145 remains fully operative until declared unconstitutional and
notes that there has been no suggestion that Section 145 is unconstitutional.
He also notes that in any constitutional inquiry, one question would be
whether the CCMA and its apparatus justified a limitation on the right of
administrative justice found in the constitution and relied upon by the Court
in Carephone.
Relying partially on the Toyota decision and partially on Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd and others v. Greater Johannesburg Transitional
Metropolitan Council and others,79 Judge Walis in Shoprite Checkers
(PTY) Limited and A Ramdaw and others,s° refused to follow Carephone in
dismissing the application to set aside an award that he found to be
erroneous. Because of the widespread acceptance of the "justifiabililty"
standard in Labor Court decisions, Judge Wallis did not accept Judge
Nicholson's view that the justifiability standard is obiter dictum. Also,
drawing upon legislative history,8 ' Judge Wallis concluded that the
Legislature intended the scope of review of Commissioner awards to be the
same as the scope of review for arbitration awards under Section 33(1) of
the Arbitration Act of 1965.
Like Judge Nicholson in Toyota, Judge Wallis complained that the
Carephone standard blurs the distinction between review and appeal,
creating an intolerable inconsistency between private arbitration and
arbitration under the LRA and sidelining the express grounds for review
See Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Lt. and Douglas Radebe and others, (2000) 3
BLLR 243 (LAC), availableat http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
79 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd. & others v. Greater Johannesburg Transitional
Metropolitan Council & others, (1999) 1 SA 374 (CC); (1998) 12 BCLR 1458 (CC),
available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/cases.html. This Constitutional Court decision
found that not every action by an organ of the state is an administrative action for purposes
of the Constitution.
so See Shoprite Checkers, (2000) 21 I.L.J. 1232 (LC).
7

81 See id. (referring to ExplanatoryMemorandum, 16 I.L.J. 278). The explanatory memo
accompanied the bill in 1995.
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under Section 145.82 Judge Wallis then challenged what he called the
"fundamental starting point" of Carephone - that arbitration decisions
under the LRA are administrative actions that warrant review for
justifiability under the Constitution. Citing Fedsure, Judge Wallis found
that the quasi-judicial action of Commissioners conducting arbitrations was
not administrative. As a consequence, even if Carephone was not dictum,
Judge Wallis declared himself unobligated to follow it. Reverting then to
Section 145, Judge Wallis reviewed the award on what he said was the only
ground for setting it aside, "gross irregularity", and dismissed the
application.
In a later pronouncement on the appropriate review standard the
Labour Appeal Court was spared the task of resolving these differences of
opinion. In Softex Mattress (Pty) Ltd v. PPWAWU & others,83 Judge
Nugent acknowledged the debate about the validity of Carephone's
"justifiability" standard elaborated in the Toyota and Shoprite Checkers
discussions. Rather than attempting to resolve the debate, Judge Nugent
applied Carephone noting that neither counsel had suggested that
Carephoneshould not apply and that the award should not be set aside even
under the more expansive Carephone standard. What followed was an
exemplary analysis of the justifiability of the Commissioner's award.
In Softex the company dismissed an employee for his alleged
involvement in the theft of beds from the company's warehouse. Suspicion
had centered upon the employee when a private investigator subjected a
security officer (SO) to a polygraph test that indicated that the SO had
knowledge about the theft. Under further questioning the SO admitted his
involvement. In an affidavit the SO implicated the employee in the theft,
saying that the employee had intimidated the SO into participating. The SO
then resigned and gave no further evidence at the disciplinary hearing or the
arbitration. The only evidence against the employee at the disciplinary
hearing was the SO's affidavit and a company record showing that the
employee had placed a telephone call to the SO during the period of the
theft. The employee denied any involvement in the theft. Based on the bias
of the SO, the hearsay nature of the evidence against the employee, and the
implausibility of the SO's story of intimidation, the Commissioner found
that the affidavit was an insufficient basis for dismissing the employee.
The Labour Court judge, affirmed by the Labour Appeal Court, found that
the arbitrator's reasons for finding an insufficient basis for dismissal
"provided a rationally justifiable basis upon which to reach that

82 Some commentators in American law have argued for the propriety of just such a
distinction between private and public arbitration. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 44.
83 See Softex Mattress (Pty) Ltd. v. Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers' Union and
Others, (2000) 12 BLLR 1402 (LAC), at 55, availableat http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
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conclusion".8 Showing a keen appreciation for the distinction between
appeal and review under the justifiability standard, the Labour Court wrote:
A critical element of fair administrative action is that the person
performing the task applied his mind to the matter before him and took
account of relevant considerations and evidence placed before him.
Whilst it might be possible that based on the same facts someone else
would come to a different conclusion, that however is not the test. In my
view (the arbitrator) was perfectly entitled to weigh up [the SO's]
confession and reject it with reasons. His decision and the reasons he
gave for it do not support the view that he committed a reviewable
irregularity.
The review application of (the arbitrator's) award must also
5
fail.8

With equal perspicacity, Judge Nugent of the Labour Appeal Court agreed,
citing Carephoneand writing:
I do not think the arbitrator can be said to have misunderstood the nature
of the enquiry. As to the conclusion that he reached, the question to be
asked is not whether his conclusion was correct but rather whether it was
capable of being arrived at rationally for the reasons that he gave, or, to
put it another way, whether there was a "rational objective basis justifying
the connection made by the (arbitrator) between the material properly
available to him and the conclusion ...
he eventually arrived at.86
CONVERGENCE
In a sense the Labour Appeal Court's successful avoidance of the
standards debate in Softex suggested that the contrast between narrow and
broad standards of review may not involve a substantive difference. This
point gains plausibility upon a closer examination of Shoprite. Judge
Wallis in Shoprite cites the Goldfields Investment Ltd and another v. City
Council of Johannesburg and another,8 7 a case that describes latent and
patent "gross irregularities" and makes the point that neither requires
intentional misconduct by the arbitrator. The central question is whether
the irregularity prevented a party from receiving a fair trial. And in the case
of "latent" gross irregularities, those that take place inside the mind of the
judicial officer, the reasoning of the arbitrator must be reviewed. Under the
"gross irregularity" standard committing error through mistake or
misunderstanding of the law is not enough. "[M]isconceiving the whole

14

Id. at [64.

85 Id. at Par 36

86

Id.at [63.

87

See Shoprite Checkers, (2000) 21 I.L.J. 1232 (LC).
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nature of the enquiry of [the arbitrator's] duties [in connection with the
enterprise] is required. ' 8
Hence a line must be drawn between "erroneous but nonreviewable findings of fact or law" and "gross irregularity." For Wallis,
"gross irregularity" could only exist if "no reasonable commissioner could
in the proper exercise of his function have made that award."8 9 Put another
way "the unreasonableness of [the Commissioner's] decision is of such a
degree as to be indefensible on any legitimate ground." 9 Because Wallis'
disagreement with the Commissioner was a matter of weighing the
evidence differently, 91 he was not able to say "no reasonable commissioner
could in the proper exercise of his function have made that award." 92
Curiously, Judge Wallis said that he would have held under the
justifiability test that the award should be set aside "in light of the
deficiencies in the Commissioner's process of reasoning." However, the
Carephone standard properly applied would seem to dictate the same result
that Judge Wallis reached under the "gross irregularity" standard. 93
Moreover, in neither the easy nor the harder cases summarized earlier
would the "gross irregularity" standard have led to a different result. An
erroneous decision without reasons as in Dairybell,for example, can hardly
be said to be defensible. Indeed, the Commissioner not supplying reasons
chooses not to mount a defense. And a Commissioner explicitly ignoring
relevant evidence as in Malelane Toyota for whatever reason would not
seem to be a "reasonable Commissioner properly exercising her function".
The decisions in both MetroCash & Carry and City Lodge Hotels involved
weighing evidence, and both the justifiability and gross irregularity
standards permit a range of reasonable outcomes in such cases. Indeed,
both the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court in reviewing the award
in Softex refer to "reviewable irregularity" and misunderstanding "the
nature of the enquiry," terms that are associated with the "gross
irregularity" standard.
Similarly, under either the "gross irregularity" or "justifiability"
standard, it should be the rare arbitration decision that is set aside, where
the Commissioner is applying a flexible standard such as "fairness" or
" Id. at 93.
'9Id. at 96.
90 Id.
91 The Commissioner found and Judge Wallis disagreed that the dismissed employee had
not deliberately discounted the purchase price of a company product for a co-worker. Id.

92
93

id.
See East Rand Gold and Uranium Co. Ltd v. CCMA & others, (1999) Case No.

J1351/97 (LC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za; Dr. Gabeba Abrahams v. South
African Cultural History Museum, (1999) Case No. C89/98 (LC), available at
http://www.legalinfo.co.za. In the above cases, the Court uses the justifiability and gross
irregularity standards interchangeably.
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"reasonableness" or interpreting an unsettled area of the law.94 On the other
hand, setting aside an award should be less troublesome and more frequent
under either standard, where the Commissioner misapplies a clear and nondiscretionary rule such as the de novo hearing rule in Malelane Toyota
Despite the standards debate, recent cases in the Labour Court
show a convergence of the justifiability and gross irregularity standards.
For example, in Waverley Blankets Limited v. CCMA & others,95 the
Labour Court finessed the issue of whether the "justifiability" or a narrower
standard is appropriate under Section 145 by dismissing the application for
review under the broader Carephone standard. The Court upheld the
Commissioner's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement in the
face of the company's challenges to the award on the grounds of gross
irregularity and lack of justifiability.9 6 Noting the standards debate the
Court rejected both claims saying:
[39] In the circumstances, I am unable to find that any valid ground has
been advanced to review and set aside the award. I have deliberately
refrained from delving into the interesting debate on the so-called narrow
or wide tests for review as revised in the Carephone decision and others
for the simple reason that in my view, the present application cannot
succeed on the grounds advanced or any other
97 competent grounds, i.e.
even on the widest possible terms for review.
In SADTU & others v. Jajbhay & others,98 a case arising under the
auspices of the Independent Mediation Services of South Africa (IMSSA)
and reviewed under the limited grounds set forth in Section 33(1) of the
Arbitration Act, the Labour Court set aside the award on the narrow basis of
gross irregularity. In finding that the appointment of teachers at a
secondary school to the posts of principal and heads of departments was
regular, the arbitrator had failed to distinguish between the procedures
required for the promotional posts in question and those for level-one posts.
The Court contrasted the narrow scope of review for private arbitration
awards under the Arbitration Act with the wider review of CCMA awards
under Carephone and found that the narrower standard was appropriate in
the case. Although careful to note that "a material mistake of fact" would
94 See Zaayman v. Provincial Director: CCMA Gauteng and Others, 1999 (20) I.L.J. 412

(LC) (upholding on review under Carephone an award where the Commissioner chose
between two possible interpretations of Section 194 of the Labor Relations Act).
95 See Waverley Blankets Ltd. v. CCMA, (2000) 1 BLLR 114 (LC), available at
http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
96

Id. at 14.

Id. at 39.
See SADTU & others v. Jajbhay & others, (2001) 1 BLLR 92 (LC), available at
http://www.legalinfo.co.za.
97
98
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constitute a gross irregularity only if it prevented "a fair trial of the issues,"
the Court held grossly irregular an "error . . .that . . . precluded the
99
[arbitrator] from applying his or her mind to the true issues in dispute."
To reinforce the point the Court cited Toyota for the proposition that even
though "mistakes of facts and law are usually insufficient grounds for
interference," the rule is subject to certain exceptions.' °
The Court
considered the arbitrator's failure to "apply his mind to the true issues of
the case" to be one such exception.101 From this analytical framework the
Court held that the award should be set aside on the basis of a gross
irregularity based on the following reasoning:
[27] Not having made such [a] distinction, the [arbitrator] clearly did not
apply his mind properly to the issue in dispute, that is, whether the
appointments [in question] were regular, or not. This grave error of fact
thereby precluded the[arbitrator] from applying his mind to the true issue
in dispute. The [arbitrator] namely appeared to accept that the prescribed
procedures were the same, without making the necessary distinction
between promotion posts and level one posts.
[28] It follows that the failure to do so amounts to the failure to apply his
mind to the issues in dispute.'1
Since the arbitrator's reasoning is also the central concern of the Carephone
justifiability standard, it is difficult to see in the SADTU decision a practical
distinction between justifiability and gross irregularity.
This convergence tendency was expressly embraced by Judge
Waglay in Cox v. CCMA & others,10 3 a decision which articulated a
Carephone-lke standard for policy reasons. Judge Wagley agreed with
Shoprite Checkers that he was not obliged to follow Carephone after the
Fedsure decision. He agreed with Judge Wallis in Shoprite Checkers that
Section 33(1) of the Arbitration Act and Section 145(2) of the LRA should
be interpreted consistently, but disagreed that the interpretation should be
narrow. Judge Waglay worried about the public's confidence in a Court
that is both empowered to review arbitration awards and powerless to
correct mistakes that "perpetuate injustice." He suggested the following
approach:
[20] Justice cannot be seen to be done by categorizing the decision(s)
made by the arbitrator. What is required is for this Court to formulate a
'9 Il at H 16, 19.
100 Id. at [20.
101 IL at

21.

'02 Id. at -H27, 28.
103Cox v. CCMA and Others, (2001) 22 I.L.J. 137 (LC).
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test that is neither superficial, formalistic or too fluid, particularly in
dealing with reviews based on section 145(2)(a)(i) of the LRA or section
33(1) of the Arbitration Act, In this respect I believe that the proper test
when dealing with these subsections is the test similar to the one laid
down in the Carephonejudgment. I say this notwithstanding the fact that
I do not consider myself bound to that judgement. Although the test set
out in Carephone is premised on an erroneous ground and further in my
view incorrectly said to fall within the ambit of section 145(2)(a)(iii) it set
out properly the duty of the arbitrator with regard to how the arbitrator's
decision is required to be arrived at. It does not, nor should it be seen to
constitute a new, separate or a constitutional ground of review but should
be seen to hold that if an arbitrator fails to arrive at a decision based on
the evidence properly before him then it must be said that he has
committed a misconduct in relation to his duties or to put it differently on
issues of merit if a decision of an arbitrator has no logical relation to the
evidence presented to him then he has failed to apply his mind to the
matter and therefore he can be said to have committed misconduct as
provided for in section 145(2)(a)(i) of the LRA or section 33(1) of the
Arbitration Act. 10 4 Similarly when an arbitrator makes a decision which
is wrong in law, this Court must be able to interfere with such an award,
however in this instance the court must only interfere where it feels
satisfied that the only reason that the arbitrator arrived at a decision which
is wrong in law, is because he failed to apply his mind to the law in
question. He would have failed to apply his mind to the law in question
only if there is no dispute about the law having regard to decisions
handed down by this Court or the Labour Appeal Court.
[21] I believe that the above test would give effect to both section
33(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act and section 145(12)(a)(i) of the LRA. The
fact that such an approach may not stem applicants seeking to appeal
against an arbitration award in the guise of a review is not a ground to
refuse to apply this test. While it does place a more onerous burden on
this Court to consider the evidence and the merits it still does not change
the process from a review to one of appeal because this Court will not
consider whether the decision is correct or not but only whether the
105
decision is based on the evidence presented at the arbitration.

,04 Even though technically Judge Waglay is melding the justifiability with the
misconduct standard under 145(a)(2)(i) rather than the gross irregularity standard under
145(a)(2)(ii), the effect on the scope of review is the same, and this distinction is not
important to the Court's policy discussion. § 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 4
JSRSA 2-165 (1998).
105 Cox, 22 I.L.J. at 142-43, 20, 21. In evaluating the Commissioner's award based on
this approach the Court examined the evidence, the Commissioner's reasoning and his
conclusions regarding the sick leave and insubordination charges underlying the dismissal
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DENOUEMENT

Ultimately, the Labor Appeal Court in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd
v. Ramdaw N.0. & Others,10 6 resolved the debate first started in that case
by Judge Wallis' decision at the Labour Court level. Embracing the
Carephone approach to reviewing CCMA arbitration awards, the Labour
Appeal Court said that the debate about whether Carephone had been
wrongly decided had become academic because of the subsequent decision
of the Constitutional Court in PharmaceuticalManufacturers of SA: in re
Ex Parte President of the RSA, 1°7 and the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act, 2000 (PAJA).
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers the
Constitutional Court held that any exercise of public power was required
under the Constitution to be based on rationality and that such exercises
could be reviewed by the Court.10 8 Since a CCMA award is an exercise of
public power, it can be judicially reviewed for rationality. Citing
Carephone's test of justifiability, 0 9 the Court declined to delineate the
precise boundaries of the concepts of "justifiability" and "rationality."
Instead it said the following:
[A]lthough the terms "justifiable" and "rational" may not, strictly
speaking, be synonymous, they bear a sufficiently similar meaning to
justify the conclusion that rationality can be said to be accommodated
within the concept of justifiability as used in Carephone. In this regard I
am satisfied that a decision that is justifiable cannot be said to be
irrational and
a decision that is irrational cannot be said to be
0
justifiable.
The PAJA, which became law in November 2000, gives effect to the
Constitutional right to administrative action "that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair.""'
The Court views the PAJA's definitions of

and found no basis for setting aside the award. The Court noted that it could not "substitute
its assessment of the evidence" for that of the arbitrator.
"o6

See Shoprite Checkers (PTY) Ltd. v. A Ramdaw, (2001) 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC).

107Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA: in re Ex Parte President of the RSA, (2000) 3

BCLR 241 (CC).
108 See id. This holding obviated Judge Wallis challenge to the fundamental starting point
of Carephone - that arbitration decisions under the LRA are administrative actions that
warrant review for justifiability under the Constitution.
109 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
110 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA: in re Ex Parte President of the RSA, (2000) 3
BCLR 241 (CC).
111Id. 27.
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administrative action as broad enough to encompass CCMA awards and its
standard for rationality as coextensive with Carephone's.
Applying the Carephone justifiability approach, the Shoprite
Checkers Court reviewed the evidence before the Commissioner, his
reasoning and his conclusions. Responding to the company's challenge that
the Commissioner's reasoning was so deficient that the award was not
justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it, the Court conceded that the
award could be criticized in a number of respects. However, the Court
found that the award could not be characterized as irrational or
unjustifiable, because the Commissioner's conclusions were supported by
some evidence in the record. 1 2 In reaching this conclusion the Court
thoroughly reviewed the company's arguments and independently
evaluated the evidence to determine whether the Commissioner's
conclusions were reasonably supported on any view of the evidence.
CONCLUSION

Where arbitration substitutes for the Labour Court as enforcer of
important statutory rights such as those contained in the LRA, the Court has
a responsibility for the outcome of an enforcement proceeding that would
arguably not exist in private arbitration 13 For this reason, the quest to
convince judges to take a completely disinterested approach to reviewing
the merits of arbitration awards in such cases seems appropriately futile.
Whether the standard is "justifiability," "gross irregularity," or
"rationality," its purpose is to preserve the socially useful attributes of
arbitration while retaining a substantive role for the Labour Court in cases
where the LRA creates a public obligation. Judge Zondo speaking for the
Labour Appeal Court in Shoprite Checkers put the matter as follows:
In my view it is within the contemplation of the dispute resolution system
prescribed by the Act that there will be arbitration awards which are
unsatisfactory in many respects but which nevertheless must be allowed
to stand because they are not so unsatisfactory as to fall foul of the
applicable grounds of review. Without such contemplation, the Act's
resolution of disputes would have no hope of
objective of the11expeditious
4
being achieved.

Under any of these standards the question should be whether the
Commissioner reached a reasoned conclusion based on a consideration of
112 Id.
113 As

84-100.
Judge Waglay suggests in Cox the special relationship between private arbitration

and CCMA conducted arbitration reduces the importance of the distinction between private
and public arbitration in dismissal cases. See Cox, 22 I.L.J. 137 (LC).
14 See Shoprite Checkers, (2001) 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC).
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relevant legal and evidentiary materials. 1 5 If the answer is yes, the process
has worked as intended with a high probability that the public interest will
be well served. An erroneous outcome alone should not be a reason for
setting aside the award. Under this approach the South African system for
resolving dismissal disputes under its core labor legislation will gain greater
legitimacy in the eyes of its users and observers, while serving the
country's overarching goal of achieving a more peaceful society.

115 See STEPHEN BURTON, JUDGING INGOOD FAITH

(1992).

